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FAILURE TO ASK DEFENDANT FOR ANY LEGAL CAUSE WHY .JUDG-
MENT SHOULD NOT BE PRONOUNCED.
The New York Court of Appeals held recently, in the case of
The People v. Beecher Faber, New York Law Journal, Vpl.
XLIV, No. 9, that the failure of the records to show that the clerk
had asked the defendant, in a murder trial, whether he had any
legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced
against him, was a serious error at common law, and is now made
so by section 48o of the Code of Criminal Procedure of that.
State.
The custom of making this inquiry seems to have originated in
our early common law in trials for high treason, where the defend-
ant was never allowed counsel, but the court was considered the
guardian of the interest of the accused. Among the earlier
reported cases on the subject are those of Rex v. Geary, 2 Salk.,
63o, and King v. Speke, 3 Salk., 358. In each of these cases, the
defendant was attainted of high treason, and confessed the same.
Upon a writ of error brought to reverse the judgment, the excep-
tion taken was, that it did not appear that the accused was asked
what he had to say why judgment should not be given against
140 YALE LAW JOURNAL
him; and the court held the exception well taken, for he might
have matter to move in arrest of judgment, or a pardon; 
and the
attainder was reversed. This custom was later extended in Eng-
land to all trials of felonies, and, it may be conceded, formed 
a
part of the common law of that country. i Chitty's Crim. 
Law.,
700.
The courts in this country are, by no means, in harmony on this
subject. The diversity of opinion among our courts is attributa-
ble to the fact that some of the courts have tried to apply strictly,
in this country, an established rule of the common law 
of Eng-
land which, by our methods of procedure, and the safeguards 
of
our law for human life, have been rendered unimportant.
In Messner v. The People, 45 N. Y., i, the court cited, with
approval, the early English cases of Rex v. Geary, supra, and
King v. Speke, supra, and gave the same reasons for holding 
that
the omission of the allocutus was error: "The court never gave
the prisoner the opportunity of showing cause why the verdict
should not be set aside or the judgment thereon arrested. It 
was
not, therefore, legally proper to proceed to judgment. For aught
that appears the prisoner may have a legal reason to show why
judgment should not pass against him."
There are many decisions in this country which support the
principal case, including decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. Croker v. State, 47 Ala., 53; Dougherty v. Common-
wealth, 69 Pa. St., 286; Ball v. United States, 14o U. S., i18;
Messner v. The People, supra. In Ball v. United States, supra,
the court said: "The forms of records are deeply seated in the
foundations of the law; and as they conduce to safety and cer-
tainty, they surely ought not to be disregarded when the life of a
human being is in question."
But there are not wanting eminent authorities holding that a
total omission of the allocutus on the record does not constitute
error. State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn., 518; State v. Bell, 27 MO., 324;
Jeffries v. Commonwealth, i2 Allen (Mass.), 145.; Gannon v.
The People, 127 Ill., 507.
In stopping to consider the reasons given, under the common
law of England. for holding an omission of the allocutus on the
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record to be error, it is hard to understand why, under our
methods of procedure, such omission should be considered fatal.
In this country, the accused is always allowed counsel, who is
familiar with the proceedings of the trial, and who knows that the
verdict is not conclusive on the prisoner. They know all the reme-
dies that may be had after verdict and how they may be instituted.
Under our system, the motion in arrest and the motion for a new
trial are disposed of before the time for the sentence arrives. "Sen-
tence is not pronounced until the party has had ample opportunity
to, move for a new trial for any proper cause, and to file his ex-
ceptions to the rulings in the matters of law, or a motion in arrest
of judgment." Jeffries v. Commonwealth, supra.
In the case of Hoyt v. State, supra, the court clearly pointed out
that the allocutus is a mere form, and no harm could possibly
come from its omission. The court said: "Under our practice
what possible harm can be occasioned to the prisoner by such
omission on the part of the court? He can have no pardon to
plead, for that can only coite from the legislature after sentence,
no attainder to save, no benefit of clergy to pray for."
"If he should say anything suggesting ground for some relief,
his saying it would not be the remedy; it would have to take on
some legal form and be filed within the time prescribed. If he
should, in a capital case, urge mitigating circumstances, and put
himself on the mercy of the court, it would avail nothing, be-
cause the court would have no discretion to exercise in regard
to the punishment."
So we have in this country these two lines of decisions: one
holding that the alIocutus is a form of record, firmly established
in our law, and should not be disregarded, because it is conducive
to safety and certainty; the other holding that the allocutus, by
reason of our court procedure, has become a mere form, an idle
ceremony, which may be omitted without prejudicing the interest
of the accused.
But in those states where the omission of the allocutus is con-
sidered a serious error, what effect has such an omission on the
proceedings? Is such an omission a ground for a new trial, or
should it be remanded with instructions to proceed from verdict?
In the principal case the court refrained from deciding this point,
saying that it was not necessary, under the circumstances of the
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case. Some courts hold that such an omission is ground for a
new trial. Messner v. The People, supra; while others hold
that such an omission is not a ground for a new trial, but the ver-
dict must stand, the case to go back to the nisi prius court for
the purpose of making the inquiry referred to, and then to pro-
nounce sentence. In State v. Hoyt, supra, the court said: "Up-
on principle it can be no ground for a new trial. There was n(
mis-trial. The error (if any) did not enter into or in any manne
affect the verdict: so that the verdict must stand; and if judg
ment should be arrested or set aside, the case should go back t
the Superior Court to be proceeded with from the point where th
error intervened, that is, the court would be called upon to mak
the inquiry referred to, and then pronounce sentence again." I
seems that the preponderance of authority is in accord with th
above case. State v. Johnson, 67 N. C., 59; Keech v. The Stat,
i5 Fla., 591 ; Kinsler v. Wyoming Territory, I Wy. Ter., 112.
IS THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED OF THE OWNER OF A PAS-
SENGER ELEVATOR AS IS REQUIRED OF A COMMON CARRIER?
It seems that the modern inclination of courts is to hold owners
of passenger elevators to the same degree of care as common car-
riers, and yet there are a few holding, with what'seems to be sound
reasoning, to the contrary. At least, there is sufficient diversity
of opinion on the subject to make the topic of practical interest.
In discussing this question, it would be well to bear in mind the
status and relation of common carriers and passenger elevators to
the public. The chief difference between the two is this: there
does not exist any prior or antecedent relation between the com-
mon carrier and passenger; but, in the case of passenger eleva-
tors, there does exist an antecedent relation. A common carrier
holds itself out to carry all who may rightfully apply for car-
riage; but a passenger elevator only holds itself out to carry
those who are tenants of the building, or guests of the hotel, who
have, in reality, purchased the elevator privilege. As there exists
this difference in these two carriers why should not there exist
a difference as to their liability to their passengers?
The case of Quimby v. Bee Building Co., 127 N. W. (Neb.),
118, recently presented itself in the Supreme Court of Nebraska,
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and that court laid down the rule, that any one who installs an
elevator in his building for the use of his tenants and the public
generally, is subject to the same degree of care in transporting
and protecting his passengers as is imposed upon common car-
riers.
The Federal courts have definitely settled this question in the
case of Marker v. Mitchell, 54 Fed., 637, which lays down the
principle that a landlord running an elevator is charged with "the
highest degree of care consistent with the possibility of injury,"
commensurate with or proportionate to the possibility of injury.
Judge Taft, agreeing with the Federal rule, in Treadwell v. Whit-
tier, 8o Cal., 574, says: "Persons operating passenger elevators
are to be treated as carriers of passengers, and the same duty
rests upon them as to care and diligence, as upon carriers of pas-
sengers by railway." In Gardsell.v. Taylor, 41 Minn., 207, the
above doctrine is virtually reiterated by the presiding judge, who
held that the same degree of responsibility rests upon elevator
owners as upon common carriers. In Illinois the injury of a
passenger in an elevator immediately raises the presumption of
negligence and want of care. Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollett,
172 Ill., 222; Fraser v. Harper House Co., 141 Ill. App., 390.
And this Illinois court goes further, in its ruling in the Chicago,
etc. Railroad Co. v. Arnol, 144 Ill., 261, by drawing an analogy
between operators of freight elevators and of freight trains, as
common carriers. The learned judge says there cannot be the
same immunity from peril in travelling on a freight train as on a
passenger train, but the same degree of care can be exercised, and
the liability of operators of freight elevators is covered by the
same rule and degree of diligence as a passenger elevator.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Sweden v. Atkinson In-
provement Co., 125 S. W. (Ark.), 439, holds with very good rea-
soning that an elevator does not have to serve the public as a com-
mon carrier, and is for the use of the hotel patrons only, yet the
law imposes the same duty upon the owner as is exacted from
common carriers. It was so held in the Kentucky Hotel Co. v.
Camp, 97 Ky., 424, that the highest degree of care and skill usually
exercised by prudent men in the same business was the rule.
Also, the Southern Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Lawson, 67 Tenn.,
367, agrees with the Kentucky rule.
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In Griffin v. Manice, 166 N. Y., 188, on the other hand, the prin-
ciple is laid down with great emphasis that the highest degree of
care and foresight is not required of elevator owners, but only rea-
sonable care. This case is sustained by McGreel v. Buffalo Office
Building Co., 153 N. Y., 265, and Biddiscomb v. Cameron, 35 N.
Y. App., 563, both holding that an elevator owner is liable only to
the extent of reasonable care. Also, in Kaye v. Rob Roy Hosiery
Co., 51 Hun (N. Y.), 519, it was said that the falling of an eleva-
tor which had been successfully used daily, with no reasonable
cause of apprehension of defect, would allow no recovery from a
person injured in it.
Numerous text-writers have commented upon this queston, and
they seem well divided as to the amount of care exacted from
elevator owners. Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, Sec. 7o4-
719, lays down a rule quite different from any other, saying that
an occupant of premises is bound to use ordinary care and dili-
gence to keep such in a safe condition; that the mere fact of the
existence of elevators is no evidence of negligence, and the owner
of the elevator is only liable for that injury which reasonable care
and vigilance would have prevented. However, Goddard's Out-
lines of Bailmnents and Carriers, p. 6o9, and Hutchinson on Car-
riers, Sec. ioo, hold contrary to the above view, citing numerous
cases to sustain their holding.
In a very strong case, Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich., 204, Justice
Carpenter is quoted as saying that "an elevator operator is not
bound to exercise the highest degree of care and diligence of a
cautious person so far as human foresight can go," but is only
required to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent man under
the circumstances. This learned judge reviews numerous cases,
and New York cases which pertinently rule, "that the stairway is
always open to those who deem this degree of diligence inadequate
for their protection." It might be added in view of the above
statement, that elevators are merely substitutes for stairways, yet
it would be highly impracticable and inexpedient to hold the
keeper of a stairway with the same degree of care as a common
carrier. But, there are buildings with moving stairways, which
answer the purpose of elevators, and since this stairway is in fact,
though not in form, an elevator, one is tempted to ask would a
court be justified in holding the owner of such a stairway with a
common carrier's liability. Such a case is yet to be decided, but
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should it arise, it would present several novel features not hereto-
fore settled.
It is contended in Edwards v. Mfg. Bldg. Co., 27 R. L, 248, that
a landlord owning an elevator is not a common carrier, nor is he
bound by the same degree of care that is imposed upon common
carriers, but must exercise only reasonable care for the safety of
those who enter his premises. He is not like a common carrier,
but his duties are limited to those who have contracted with him
for the use of his premises, or those who have business with his
tenants. The above view is also held in Shattuck v. Rand, 142
Mass., 83.
In conclusion, it might be said that the numerical preponder-
ance, including the Federal court, is without a doubt in favor of
holding elevators and common carriers to the same liability, yet it
appears that the position taken by the courts of New York, Michi-
gan and Rhode Island is far from being unsound or unjust, and
in many cases may be conducive to justice.
DEVOTIONAL EXERCISES IN TIIE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS INTERFERING
WITH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
The Constitution of the United States provides that no religious
test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or pub-
lic trust under the United States. U. S. Constitution, Art. VI.
It also provides that Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or the free enjoyment thereof. U. S.
Constitution, Amend. I. These provisions do not establish reli-
gious freedom within the common meaning of the term. It is
not their purpose to secure to every person the right to worship
according to the dictates of conscience. They only intend to
remove the matter of religion or worship, man's duty to his Crea-
tor, from the cognizance of the civil Government. And even in
this they go no further than to limit the actions of Congress. They
do not undertake "to protect the religious liberty of the people of
the states against the actions of their respective State govern-
ments." Cooley: Prin. of Const. Lazv, Chap XIII, Sec. I.
The states, left free to adjust religious liberty as they saw fit.
have without exception made provision by constitutional guaran-
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ties to their subjects. Ibid. These constitutional restrictions pro-
vide not for a system of religious toleration, but for a system of
religious equality, respecting all religions, without favor, dis-
crimination or distinction, so long as they do not offend the com-
mon sense of public decency or extend their teachings to the sanc-
tion of things which in a Christian land are generally looked upon
as contra bonos mores. It is true that in addition to this policy
of religious equality, these restrictions also exempt the citizens
from compulsory support and attendance of religious worship as
well as restraints upon its free exercise, never forgetting, how-
ever, that it must always be borne in mind that the prevailing
religion of the country ig Christian. Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs.
2 Howard (U. S.), 127.
The courts have often been called upon to determine from these
constitutional restrictions against compulsory support of religion
and from the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom,
whether or not the Bible can be used in the public schools. These
cases have almost without exception involved the consideration of
two questions, namely: Is the Bible a sectarian book? and does
the use of it in the exercises of the schools convert the school
building into a place of worship, so that the school patron as a
taxpayer is thereby being compelled to support a religious institu-
tion? The Supreme Court of Illinois in a recent case, The People
ex rel. Ring v. The Board of Education of School District 24,
92 N. E. (Ill.), 251, held, in over-ruling a decision of the lower
court, that the reading of the King James version of the Bible in
the school was a violation of both these restrictions. While this
decision is in harmony with the result reached by the Nebraska
courts in State v. Scheve, 65 Neb., 853 and the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in State v. District Board, 76 Wis., 177, it was dis-
sented to in a strong minority opinion by two of the judges of the
court, and it seems evident that the weight of authority favors the
minority opinion.
The leading case upon this subject is Donahue v. Richards, 38
Me., 379- In this case a regulation of the school board required
that a portion of the Protestant version of the Bible be read each
morning and that during such reading the pupils be required to
bow their heads and remain quiet and orderly; no pupil was
required to attend this part of the exercise against the wish of his
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parent or guardian. The court held that the school board had
authority to make such a regulation for the school if they saw fit,
and that they were justified in expelling a pupil from school who
refused to abide by the regulation. Such a regulation, they said,
was not in violation of the Constitution and did not constitute
sectarian worship.
The same question came before the Massachusetts court in an
early case, and the court gave it as their opinion that a school
committee have legal power to pass a rule requiring a school to be
opened by reading from the Bible and praying every morning,
that during such prayer each child shall bow his head, excusing
any scholar from these exercises whose parent or guardian
requests it, but that any pupil whose parents refuse to make the
request and who refuses to obey the rule may be expelled from the
school. Spiller v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 12 Allen (Mass.),
127.
The use in the public schools for fifteen minutes at the close of
each day's session as a supplemental text-book on reading of a
book entitled Readings from the Bible, which is largely made
up of extracts from the Bible, emphasizing the moral precepts of
the Ten Commandments, where the teacher is forbidden to make
any comment and is required to excuse any pupil from that part
of the session whose parent or guardian requests it, is not a viola-
tion of the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom or ex-
emption from compulsory worship. Mandamus proceedings to
stop it will be refused. Pfeiffer v. Board of Education of Detroit,
118 Mich., 56o.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa, 367,
refused to grant an injunction at the instance of a taxpayer whose
children were not required to be present or take part in such ex-
ercises to restrain the reading and repeating portions of the Bible
in the school where his children attended, and declared that a
statute which provided that the Bible should not be excluded from
any school or institution, no pupil being required to read it con-
trary to his own or his parents or guardian's wishes, is not a
violation of the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
It seems also that even the Illinois court has heretofore been in
accord with this principle. In the case of North v. The Trustees
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the University of Illinois (a school supported by appropria-
tions by the State), 137 Ill., 296, the court held that a rule requir-
ing the students to attend chapel exercises, which consisted of
brief sessions of reading the Bible, repeating the Lord's prayer,
and singing religious hymns was not a violation of the Constitu-
tion, and that the exercises were not sectarian. The court refused
writ of mandamus to permit a student who had been expelled for
non-compliance with this rule to re-enter the University.
There is, perhaps, no book that is so widely used and so highly
respected as the Bible; no other that has been translated into as
many tongues; no other that has had such marked influence upon
the habits and life of the world. It is not the least of its mar-
velous attributes that it is so catholic that every seeming phase of
belief finds comfort in its comprehensive precepts. There are
many translations of it. The authenticity of parts of some of the
editions are disputed by different denominations, while there are
some persons who doubt that any of it is the inspired word of
God; yet it remains that civilized mankind generally accord to it
a reverential regard, and all who study it carefully admit that it
is, from any point of view, one of the most important of books.
That it, or any particular version of it, has been adopted by
one or more denominations as authentic, or by them asserted to be
inspired, cannot make it a sectarian .book. Hackett v. Brookville
School District, 12o Ky., 6o8, 616.
A law is not unconstitutional because it may prohibit what one
may conscientiously think right or require what one may con-
scientiously think wrong. The civil law knows no religion or
form of religion as such as having any binding effect against
its will as constitutionally expressed. It regards all religions as
having equal rights. It goes no further than to recognize the
Supreme goodness of a Sovereign Ruler of the Universe. Its
doctrine is the supremacy of the people and that all free govern-
ments are founded on their authority and for their benefit. The
basic principle of all Republican Government is the right of the
majority of the people to establish, through the legislatures, the
general rules or laws of conduct for the citizens of that govern-
ment, and it is inconsistent with such a form of government that
any citizen, or body of citizens less than a majority, shall be legally
absolved from obedience to those rules because they may conflict
with his or their conscientious views of religious duty or right.
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It is injecting religious controversy into the Civil Government
when that is the very thing from which these constitutional
guaranties sought to keep it free. Donahue v. Richards, supra.
It is not the object of these ,provisions to insure the aid of the
courts to propagandists who would take upon themselves the mis-
sion of destroying the influence of the Bible. Moore v..Monroe,
supra.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY.
In Jeff ries v. Neu, York Evening Journal, 124 N. Y. Supp., 780,
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from using the plain-
tiff's name, portrait or picture in, or in connection with, a so-
called biography or life history of the plaintiff. Plaintiff relied
upon section 5r of the Civil Rights Law, which prohibits the use
of any person's name, portrait or picture, without his consent,
for advertising purposes, or for purposes of trade. It was held
that a person's picture is not used for advertising purposes, or
for purposes of trade, unless it is a part of an advertisement, nor
is it used for purposes of trade, within the section, when merely
used for dissemination of information, and not for commerce or
traffic.
That the individual shall have full protection in person and
property, is a principle as old as the common law. As Judge
Cooley states it, "he has the absolute right to be let alone."
Cooley on Torts, third ed., p. 29. None of the great commentators
mention a "right of privacy." The courts are by no means uni-
form upon the point, therefore in many of the states, where the
right is denied to exist as a legal doctrine, civil rights laws are
passed.
A close analysis of all the English cases cited in support of the
right, show that they turned upon property or contract rights.
In order that an injunction may issue to restrain the defendant
from using a plaintiff's name, the use of it must be such as to
injure plaintiff's reputation or property. Dockrell v. Dougall, 78
L. T. R., 840. In Prince Albert v. Strange, I Al. N. & G., 23, the
queen and prince having made some etchings and drawings for
their amusement, decided to have copies made from the etched
plates, for presentation to their friends. The workman employed
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to make the copies made some on his own account, and transferre(
them to Strange, who purported to exhibit them. Lord Cotten
ham, in granting an injunction, said: "Privacy is the right ir.
vaded. A man is entitled to be protected in the exclusive use an
enjoyment of that which is exclusively his." The court's dec-
sion, however, was based upon the property rights in the etche
plates, and breach of faith on the part of the workman.
In Tuck & Sons v. Priester, 19 Q. B. D., 639, the plaintiff wa
owner of a picture, and employed defendant to make a certaih
number of copies. The defendant also made a number of copie
for himself, and offered them for sale. The court issued an in
junction, and awarded damages, upon the ground of an impliec
contract not to make more copies than were ordered by plaintiff.
So also in the case of Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div.
345,'the plaintiff had her photograph made by defendant, whc
made some extra copies from the iegative, and placed them upor
exhibition. Injunction was issued upon the theory of the property
right of the plaintiff in the negative likeness, and upon the impliee
contract of defendant. There is a dictum in this case, that if de-
fendant had secured the original likeness without plaintiff's knowl-
edge, there would have been no right of action.
In the United States, the earliest mention we find of the "right
of privacy," as such, is an able article, "The Right of Privacy," 4
Harv. Law R., 193 (189o). The earliest case in point is Schuyler
v. Curtis, 147 N. Y., 434. In this case the plaintiff sought to en-
join the defendant from exhibiting a statue or bust of a relative.
Injunction was denied, on the ground that if a right had existed,
it expired at the death of the person. There is dictum in that
case, that courts have power, in some cases, to enjoin the doing of
an act, when the nature or character of the act itself is well cal-
culated to wound the sensibilities of an individual, and when the
doing of the act is wholly unjustifiable, and is, in legal contempla-
tion, a wrong, even though the existence of no property is involved
in the subject. Relying upon this dictum, the plaintiff in Rober-
son v. Rochester Box Co., 71 N. Y., 538, sought to enjoin the
defendant from publishing her picture without her consent, upon
an advertisement of a brand of flour. The injunction was denied
by a divided court, four to three. Parker, Ch. J., in delivering the
opinion of the majority, said, "If such a principle be incorporated
into the body of the law, the attempt to logically apply the princi-
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ple will lead not only to a vast amount of litigation, but to litiga-
tion bordering upon the absurd. The right of privacy once estab-
lished as a legal doctrine cannot be confined to the restraint of
the publication of a likeness, but must necessarily embrace, as
well, the publication of a word picture." This holding was fol-
lowed by a very recent case, Henry v. Cherry, 73 AtI., 97 (R. I.,
I9O9), emphatically denying the existence of such a right, which
held: "There is no common law right of privacy, which will give
one a right of action for the publication, by another, of his photo-
graph as part of an advertisement of the latter's business, al-
though mental suffering is thereby inflicted upon him."
But opposed to this view the Federal court in Corliss v. W'alkei,
64 Fed., 28o, recognizes the right of a private individual to pro-
hibit the reproductiQn of his photograph. They distinguish be-
tween a private and a publid individual, and define a public char-
acter as any individual who seeks or desires public recognition.
Doubtless the courts will get into hopeless corifusion in any at-
tempt to enforce such a distinction, for if the right of privacy
exists in one individual, i*t exists in all, although it may have more
value to one person than to another.
The Georgia court, in Paversick v. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga., 19O,
declare in favor of the right of privacy. Adopting and following
the dissenting opinion of Gray, J., in Roberson v. Box Co., supra,
Cobb, J., in delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, said:
"The right of privacy is derived from'the natural law. The right
of privacy may be waived expressly or by implication. A waiver
authorizes an invasion of the right only to such an extent as is
necessarily implied from the purposes for which the waiver was
made. A person who desires to live a life of seclusion cannot be
compelled, against his consent, to exhibit his person in a public
place, unless such exhibition be demanded by law. One who de-
sires to live a life of partial seclusion has a right to choose the
times, places, and manner, in which, and at which, he will sub-
mit to the public gaze. Subject to the limitations above referred
to, the body of a person cannot be put on exhibiton at any time, or
at any place, without his consent." Foster v. Chinn, 134 Ky.,
.424, holds, that a person is entitled to the right of privacy as to
his picture, and that the publication of his picture, without his con-
sent, as a part of an advertisement for the purpose of exploiting
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the publisher's business, is a violation of his right of privacy, and
entitled him to recover without proof of special damages.
Our Supreme Court raises a sensible query in Brown v. Meyer,
.39 U. S., 540, when it says: "It is difficult to understand why
the peculiar cast of one's features is not also one's property, and
why its pecuniary value, if it has any, does not belong to its owner,
rather than to the person seeking to make an unauthorized use of
it."
From a close survey of all the cases involving the so-called
right of privacy, it seems; by the weight of authority, that injury
to property, in some form, is an essential element to relief. But
following the suggestion in Brown v. Meyer, supra, it seems that
one has a property right in his photograph.
